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Abstract
This paper presents solutions for certain advanced security features in UMTS developed in the ACTS
project ASPeCT, namely Trusted Third Party services for certification and key escrow and a new scheme
for the billing for WorldWideWeb based Value Added Services using micropayments. The solutions will
be validated in demonstrators whose architectures are described.
1.  Introduction
It is generally accepted now that adequate security features must form an integral part of a mobile
telecommunications system. In second generation systems such as GSM and DECT, security features
based on cryptographic techniques have been included in a systematic way for the first time. Their
success is undeniable: second generation systems are much less susceptible to fraud than their
predecessors. However, the increasing, and increasingly diverse, demand for security by users,
operators and regulatory bodies calls for more advanced security features in third generation systems,
such as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). It is the goal of the ACTS
project AC095 ASPeCT to specify such advanced features and propose solutions.
Some of these advanced security features to be provided in UMTS will be made possible by the use
of more powerful smart card technology not yet available for second generation systems. This
technology - together with the use of suitably adapted security mechanisms -  will make the use of so-
called public-key techniques in mobile systems possible for the first time. Trusted Third Parties
(TTPs) will provide the infrastructure for the use of these techniques. The services which TTPs
provide - among others certification of public keys, support of key management for end-to-end
security services, and key escrow services - are described in more detail in section 2 of this paper.
TTPs also enable the provision of non-repudiation services based on digital signatures, opening the
possibility of secure billing services over UMTS. We concentrate on a new scheme to bill the user for
value added services which we expect to become increasingly important. Corresponding details are
presented in section 3 of this paper.
2.  Trusted Third Parties and Key Escrow
The role of TTPs to support security services is recognised in a wide variety of application domains,
and with a wide variety of cryptographic techniques. Within the ASPeCT project we will primarily be
concerned with the use of TTPs in providing mobile telecommunications services using public key
cryptography (at least for key management). More specifically we will be concerned with the
provision of secure billing services and end-to-end security services.
To support secure billing services the TTP will act as a certification authority for the public keys of a
mobile user and a value-added service provider (VASP). The mobile user and the VASP will each
have its own TTP which may generate and distribute public keys for them.
To provide end-to-end encryption the TTP will act as a secret key distribution centre with a key
escrow facility to satisfy lawful interception requirements. From associated TTPs, clients can obtain
appropriate secret keys and interception agencies will be able to obtain escrowed keys when
presenting a warrant.
2.1  Public key infrastructure
One well established role for TTPs in supporting public key cryptographic techniques is in the
generation of public key certificates. Within ASPeCT we will be implementing this TTP function,
and in demonstrating this functionality we hope to deal with some of the complex issues surrounding
the verification of user identities, and the validation of user keys. The public key certificates
generated using this TTP will be of fundamental importance in supporting the billing security
functions.
ASPeCT TTPs will be responsible for the following tasks to support certification of public keys:
generation of certificates, maintenance of Directory Information Bases (DIBs), which are used to
store certificates, management of Directory Information Trees (DITs), which are used to issue a
particular certificate to a particular entity via a suitable certification path, revocation of invalid
certificates, and generation and maintenance of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). We are currently
concerned with the generation of certificates, including client certificates, TTP certificates and cross
certificates in the first TTP demonstration of ASPeCT.
A non-standard, compact certificate format was chosen as both storage space on a smart card and
bandwidth on the air interface are strictly limited. Each certificate for a public key consists of two
parts: a certificate type identifier and a signed certificate information sequence. We have two types of
certificates in ASPeCT, depending on the signature mechanisms used. The first type makes use of
RSA-signature based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 [1], where the signed certificate information sequence
includes a signed recoverable string and a non-recoverable part. The second type makes use of AMV-
signature based on ISO/IEC 14888-3 [2], where the signed certificate information sequence is the
certificate information sequence itself together with an appendix - the signature of the sequence.
The certificate information sequence includes a basic certificate information and a set of extended
attributes providing other optional information about both the subject and the issuer. Table 1 shows a
certificate information sequence format for ASPeCT.
Table 1. A certificate information sequence format
Field Contents Description
1 Map field This field gives the map which fields and options will be presented in the certificate.
2 Version The version number of the certificate.
3 Serial Number Unique number of the certificate, assigned by the issuer.
4 Public key
identifier
Optional. Unique identifier of the public key to be used to verify the signature on this certificate.
5 Issuer identifier Two options for the issuer identifier: hashed or plain.
6 Validity Including certificate valid period and optional private key usage period.
7 Subject identifier Two options for the subject identifier: hashed or plain.
8 Subject key usage Optional. The usage of the subject key being certified.
9 Cross certificate
attributes
Optional. Two situations: either forward or backward cross certificate.
10 Certificate path
attributes
Optional. The number of related certificates and a list of subject identifiers included in the
certificate path.
11 Subject public key
information
An algorithm identifier plus a public key value for the subject. Three examples of algorithms are
foreseen: RSA, elliptic curve and Diffie-Hellman over GF(p).
2.2  End to end confidentiality
Another important role for TTPs in future mobile networks will be in supporting the particularly
sensitive issue of end-to-end confidentiality. For a variety of reasons it may be necessary for copies
of keys used to provide such a service to be held ‘in escrow’, so that they can be provided to
authorised entities wishing to read encrypted messages at some future time. The use of TTPs to
support such a service is widely seen as the way forward.
Thus, in parallel with the use of the TTPs to provide public key certificates, we will be implementing
the key escrow functionality within the ASPeCT TTP infrastructure. This will, amongst other things,
require the design and specification of an escrow interface, as well as the specification and design of
a public key based key management system to support key escrow.
The following protocol, as one example of a key escrow mechanism, will be used in the initial TTP
demonstration. It is based on the JMW proposal described in [3]. In this protocol every client has an
associated TTP. If two clients, communicating with each other securely by using end-to-end
encryption, are located in different domains, then the relevant pair of TTPs (one in each domain)
collaboratively perform the dual role of providing the users with key management services and
providing the two interception agencies with warranted access to the users’ communications. A
session key for end-to-end encryption is established based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key
exchange [4]. An asymmetric key agreement pair for one client (the receiver) is separately computed
by both TTPs using a combination of a secret key shared between them and the receiver’s name, and
another asymmetric key agreement pair for the other user (the sender) is generated optionally either
by himself or by his own TTP. The receiver computes the session key by combining his private key
(transferred securely from his TTP) with the sender’s public key (sent with the encrypted message).
The sender computes the same session key by combining his private key with the receiver’s public
key (obtained from the sender’s own TTP). Interception agencies in each domain can retrieve the
session key from the TTP in the same domain.
2.3  Architecture of the TTP server
ASPeCT TTPs are designed and specified for implementation in PCs. These will be used in trials and
demonstrations of secure billing services and end-to-end encryption services in UMTS.
The architecture of the TTP server has four layers, namely external communication layer, TTP
security control layer, TTP function and operation layer and cryptographic function layer. Between
the first and second layers, there is a TTP access interface; between the second and third layers, there
is a TTP security service interface; and between the third and fourth layers, there is a Cryptographic
interface.
3.  Secure Billing
3.1 Charging for value added services
A UMTS user will be offered a much larger variety of services than in today’s networks. But there
will still be a distinction between basic tele- and bearer- services, such as traditional telephony, video
telephony or high speed data services, and services offering added value to the user, such as the
provision of a particular piece of information the user needs. Our work on secure billing in UMTS
concentrates on a new scheme to bill the user for such value added services (VAS).
It is expected that the number and variety of VASs will greatly increase while current networks are
evolving towards UMTS. One reason for this is that users will increasingly possess terminals with
much larger processing and display capabilities than today’s mainly speech orientated terminals.
Personal mobile communicators will integrate the functions of a mobile phone and of a laptop or
palmtop PC. These devices may be used to access information of a much more complex nature than
that available to users of VASs in mobile systems today: Instead of being restricted to the character
oriented display of his handy, the user will be able to display e.g. hypertext-documents with included
graphics, so, instead of numbers giving the prices of stock he may view charts of stock indices,
instead of textual information on the nearest hotels he may view a street map of his surroundings
indicating the location of the hotels, or he may view a coverage map of the mobile operator in whose
domain he is roaming.
The charging for today’s VASs consists of a basic charge for the basic service and a premium for the
added value. Both are based on the duration of the call. In the future, due to the greater variety of
services offered more flexible charging schemes for the premium would be desirable. Flexibility
relates to the parameters which determine the charge (in addition to the duration of the call, the
charge may depend e.g. on the amount of data transferred, different tariffs may apply for different
information items), to the variety of different possible tariffs and to the ease with which a certain
tariff can be changed.
Also, the value of a particular piece of information retrieved by a user from a VAS provider at one
time may be quite small so that the charging scheme would not warrant a large financial overhead to
process the charge. In addition, the scheme has to have a performance compatible with the
requirements of a mobile system. In short, the charging scheme must be also efficient.
It is expected that the evolution of current mobile systems towards UMTS will also see the
emergence of many new network operators, UMTS service providers and VAS providers which may
have serious implications for the trust relations among them. The charging scheme must be secure
against cheating, and the parties involved should have the assurance that justified claims relating to
charges can be proved and that unjustified claims cannot be successfully made. This is called
incontestable charging.
ASPeCT will demonstrate a proposed charging scheme for VASs in UMTS which satisfies the above
requirements. The charging scheme is a credit-based payment scheme using micropayments
according to Pedersen [5]. A similar scheme was recently published by Rivest and Shamir [6]. In the
demonstrator, the user - acting as a Web client - will be able to retrieve WorldWideWeb pages from a
VAS provider - acting as a Web server - over a mobile link.
We assume in our model that the user has a subscription with a UMTS service provider. Then, the
only on-line communication required in the charging procedure is that between the user and the VAS
provider while the service is being provided. The VAS provider will forward the information proving
his claims on the user to the user’s UMTS service provider off-line who in turn will bill the user, also
off-line. The UMTS service provider will also take care of the payments to the network operators
involved in providing the needed connectivity.
A crucial element in our model is the User Identity Module which is a smart card held by the user and
issued by his UMTS service provider. This smart card will be multi-functional, and will contain the
security procedures to access basic UMTS services as well as advanced payment features. A
particular feature of our solution is that the authentication protocol used for basic service access may
be re-used in our charging scheme for VASs.
In section 3.2 below, the protocols of our proposed charging scheme are presented. In section 3.3, the
architecture of our demonstrator is described.
3.2 Security protocols
The charging consists of two phases: In the initialization phase (see Figure 1) , the user (denoted by
U in the protocol description) and the VAS provider (denoted by V) authenticate each other and agree
on a session key, and the user commits himself to a starting value for the micropayment scheme and a
certain tariff by performing a digital signature on corresponding data. The authentication protocol is
identical with one submitted to ETSI SMG for UMTS user-to-network authentication [7]. The
starting value is the n-th iterate of a one-way function applied to a random value chosen by the user,
as described below. In the data transfer phase, the user pays by releasing the pre-images of the
starting value, so-called “ticks“ which represent unit charges. The value of one unit charge is agreed
upon in the initialization phase. The  “ticks“ serve as proof to the VAS provider that the user incurred
certain charges because only the user could have generated them. They are presented by the VAS
provider to the user’s UMTS service provider to clear the charges. The particular efficiency of the
scheme stems from the fact that the user may commit himself to a large number of payments of unit
charges with only one signature. Images of one-way functions are much less expensive to compute
and to transmit than signatures.
The two protocols corresponding to the two phases are presented in the following. For the sake of
brevity, we omit a third protocol, the so-called “re-initialization protocol“ which is used when the
user runs out of  “ticks“ while the call is still in progress.
For the description of the protocols, a few bits of mathematical notation are needed. The protocols
run in the framework of a finite group G with generator g, e. g. the multiplicative group of a finite
field or a subgroup of an elliptic curve, in which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard. Both U and
V can efficiently perform operations and randomly select elements in G. There is a function f which
maps G onto a set of bit strings, a length-preserving one-way function F: {0,1}n → {0,1}n, a one-way
function h2, and hash functions h1 and h3, which are considered common knowledge in the system.
U and V possess a symmetric encryption function, where {M}K denotes the encryption of message M
with key K. V has secret and public key agreement keys v and gv respectively. U possesses an
asymmetric signature scheme with secret key KU -, with public key KU+, and with the secret signature
transformation SigU. Authentic copies of gv and of KU+ are available to U and V respectively or may
be sent by V to U (U to V respectively), accompanied by a certificate issued by a Trusted Third Party
(see section 2 above). The identity of V is assumed to be known to U at the start of the protocols.
The authentication and initialization of charge ticks protocol (see Figure 1) works as follows: U
generates a random number u and then computes a temporary key agreement key gu which he sends to
V. On receipt of the first message, V does not know with whom he is communicating. V generates a
random number r, computes (gu)v and a sort of Diffie-Hellman session-key with additional freshness
assurance for both sides K := h1(f((gu)v)||r) =h1(f((gv)u)||r). He confirms possession of the derived
key K by sending a hash value h2(K, r). V also sends to U some charge data ch_data, e.g., the tariff
on which the charging is to be based, and a time stamp tV. U has to check if the time-stamp and the
tariff information received is acceptable to him. In the third message, U commits himself to the
charge data, the time-stamp and a starting value for the tick payment scheme by including this data in
the signature in the third message. Let T be a system-wide fixed parameter, specifying the number of
ticks that can be paid by U with a single signature. U generates a random seed α0 and computes αi =
F(αi-1 ) for i=1,...,T, i.e. αi =F i(α0 ). He includes αT in the third message as shown in Figure 1. αT need
not be kept confidential. U confirms knowledge of K by signing a hash value which must be different
from h2(K, r). In the third message U also encrypts his identity IdU to ensure anonymity. We assume
the use of an El Gamal type signature system. In the general case, the signature in the third message
has to be encrypted as well to ensure anonymity.
The main feature of the charge ticks protocol is that within a short time a large number of small
charges (ticks) must be confirmed by U. On one hand, both U and V do not want to carry out a
complete charging procedure for each of the ticks, due to the waste of computation resources and the
short time between ticks.   On  the other  hand, V  does  not  want to compute  the  corresponding  bill
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Figure 1   Authentication and initialization of charge ticks protocol
covering the cumulative amount after the completion of  the call session, because U could
maliciously interrupt the protocol previous to providing V with a signature on the cumulative amount.
The solution for the charge ticks protocol is as follows. Assume that the charge ticks protocol is
ongoing, and that U has been asked by V to pay for tick t. U confirms for tick t by releasing the pre-
image F T- t(α0). Note that several ticks maybe released at once. When the call session  has ended, or
the maximum number T of ticks per signature has been reached, V stores the last received pre-image
α and the number of ticks tck_cnt consumed by U during the current run of the charge ticks protocol.
V composes and stores the transcript of the charge ticks transaction, representing the cheque to be
claimed.
3.3 Architecture of the demonstrator
The demonstrator will be built in two stages. The first version will be based on PCs representing the
user and the VAS provider. The user’s smart card will be attached via a card reader to the PC.
Connectivity will be provided initially by wired links and by GSM data connections. The second
version of the demonstrator will be trialled in a UMTS testbed provided by ACTS project EXODUS
and will feature on-line Trusted Third Parties.
Regarding the protocol architecture, it is particularly worth emphasizing that our concept permits the
use of existing applications (WorldWideWeb client and server) as well as of existing communication
stacks (TCP/IP). Most applications useful in our context are based on a standardized interface,
namely sockets, or, in a Windows environment, more specifically Windows sockets. There are three
protocol layers (cf. Figure 2 below): An application layer, a communication layer and a security layer
in between, realizing the security functionality as described in section 3.2. The security layer
provides Windows sockets to the application layer. There is no need to modify the application and
there is no need for an extended security interface. The security layer uses Windows Sockets to
access the communication stack. In this way, the security layer is independent from particular






Figure 2 - protocol stack
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